Coverage Flexibility for Qualified Retirement Plans After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by Kovach, Richard J.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Tax Journal Akron Law Journals
1988
Coverage Flexibility for Qualified Retirement Plans
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Richard J. Kovach
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Tax Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kovach, Richard J. (1988) "Coverage Flexibility for Qualified Retirement Plans After the Tax Reform Act of 1986,"
Akron Tax Journal: Vol. 5 , Article 5.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol5/iss1/5
COVERAGE FLEXIBILITY FOR QUALIFIED RETIREMENT
PLANS AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
by
RICHARD J. KOVACH*
The Tax Reform Act of 1986' substantially changed the participation
coverage criteria for qualified retirement plans. The purpose of this article is
to set forth selected observations about the problems and opportunities that
now exist 2 respecting planning for coverage exclusions under the Internal Revenue
Code Accordingly, this article will consider both surviving concepts from prior
law and new rules that emerge from the 1986 Tax Act.
I. DETERMINING WHO ARE EMPLOYEES
A. Common Law Employment Status
Determining who are employees among all persons who render services
to the sponsoring employer of a qualified retirement plan is usually viewed
as a simple task, especially if no attempt has been made to manipulate arguable
circumstances toward one side or the other of the common law definition of
employment status.4 Attempts to manipulate the employment status of persons
rendering services frequently occur, however, in a variety of contexts relating,
for example, to imposition of employment taxes 5 or duties under local laws
such as state statutes known as "prevailing wage" enactments 6
Failed attempts to manipulate employment status can affect the qualifica-
*Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law; A.B. Oberlin College, 1970; J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1974.
.Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
2Some aspects of coverage regulation survive from pre-1986 law, and other aspects arise as a result of
Pub. L. No. 99-514, effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 1988.
3 This and all subsequent references to the Internal Revenue Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, except where expressly noted otherwise. Subsequent textual references will be expressed in the form
"Section _ "
4 As used in numerous tax cases and revenue rulings, the common law definition of employment status
determines whether there exists for the recipient of services a right to control the activities of the individuals
whose status is in issue, not only as to results to be accomplished by the work but also as to the means
and methods to be used for accomplishing the results. See ALSCO Storm Windows, Inc. v. United States,
311 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1962). Many authorities relying on this standard set forth a non-exhaustive list of
employment status facts and circumstances that are accumulated and weighed in particular situations. For
example, consideration may be given to whether the provider of services supplied his or her own tools
or equipment, worked assigned hours, or exclusively provided services to only one recipient.
5 Avoidance of state and federal employment taxes is perhaps the most common context in which the employ-
ment status issue is raised. For a discussion of federal legislative developments in the last ten years affect-
ing the determination of whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee, see Solomon and
Schlesinger, "Section 1706: Where it Came From and Where it is Going," 66 Taxes 50-55 (January, 1988).
6 For example, Ohio Revised Code Section 4115.04 requires employers who construct public improvements
to pay their employees the same wages as prevailing in the locale for workers under collective bargaining
agreements. Of course, the employment status issue is also critically important to the tort law doctrine
of respondeat superior.
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tion of a deferred compensation plan in at least three ways, each relating to
the basic requirement of I.R.C. Section 401(a) that a qualified plan benefit the
employees of an employer. First, if persons are assumed to be non-employees,
and therefore are not covered by the plan, insufficient coverage may result under
Section 410 or Section 401(a)(26), or both. Second, if persons allowed to par-
ticipate in the plan are regarded as non-employees for purposes unrelated to
the plan and such status is consistently applied for plan purposes, the exclusive
benefit rule of I.R.C. Section 401(a)(2) may be violated? Third, a person arguably
receiving compensation as an employee for services rendered to an employer
may improperly establish a Keogh plan on the theory that compensation is paid
for independent, non-employment services.8
Any employer who has had an opportunity to predicate an important tax
or non-tax result upon a determination of common law employment status would
realize that such status could serve as a flexible and potentially boundless means
to define coverage exclusions for qualified plans. Thus, even before one were
to take advantage of the statutory and individually designed exclusions permit-
ted under Section 410, he or she might consider the coverage effects of chang-
ing, if possible, the employment status of various persons otherwise regarded
as employees.
Of course, the same technical problems encountered in employment tax
and local law situations can occur respecting employment status determina-
tions for employee benefit plan purposes. Above all it should be borne in mind
that determinations of employment status involve a "facts and circumstances"
test and not a "black or white" mechanical rule, despite attempts by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to resolve hypothetical employment status disputes in the
facile format typical of revenue rulings and other similar administrative promul-
gations directed toward the issue9
Employment status disputes tend to be as highly litigable as valuation
disputes. These two tax issues are highly litigable usually because so much
depends upon the outcome of the dispute and because the outcome is often
predicated upon a great many situational factors. No single situational factor
is determinative of the outcome and the aggregate of the factors may be viewed
7 Specifically, the plan may inadvertently benefit persons who are not employees or the beneficiaries of
employees.
8 See Pulver v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,437 (1982), which was decided in favor of the taxpayer,
a professional engineer who did independent consulting work for his employer outside his regular job
and thus was allowed to maintain his own qualified plan respecting the consulting income.
9Any commercial tax service will provide numerous citations to IRS rulings addressing the issue. Most
rulings find in favor of employment status by referring to general indications of control by the recipient
of services while ignoring other facts and circumstances that may differentiate the workers in question
from other workers who admittedly are employees. It should be remembered that IRS rulings offer little
or no authority in a litigated employment status dispute and that juries in particular may allow considerably
more leeway for employment status designations than does the IRS.
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QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS
subjectively to a large degree. 0 Consequently, all attempts to convert employees
into independent providers of services involve a substantial amount of risk if
business is basically carried on as usual, even if the service personnel make
formal declarations of their "independent" status and are in some ways actu-
ally treated differently than before their metamorphosis.'I
But the employment status problem can arise even if certain persons have
been consistently treated as non-employees from the outset of their service.
Consultants, "outside" salespersons, and part-time, temporary, and "casual"
workers are frequently among those whose status as non-employees can be
disputed, even though the affected parties never thought of themselves as hav-
ing an employment relationship. Sometimes the dispute arises not as a result
of intended manipulations but because of a naive failure to appreciate the full
implications of a particular service relationship. 2
Advisors who design qualified plan coverage exclusions may want to ask
themselves three key questions in view of the potential volatility of employ-.
ment status determinations: Which existing employment status determinations
at least arguably could be viewed as incorrect, given a fair review of all rel-
evant facts and circumstances? Having identified the number of arguable
ambiguous determinations, which of such are most and least ultimately de-
fensible? Assuming the least defensible determinations are eventually found in
error, have the plan's coverage exclusions been designed with a sufficient margin
of error to account for the potentially erroneous determinations? 3
More aggressive advisors who actually desire to manipulate service statuses
so as to effect a first tier of de facto coverage exclusions will obviously rely
much on their skills at risk-benefit analysis. Because of the litigable nature of
employment status issues, their task, difficult but not impossible, takes at least
as much nerve as knowledge and foresight in setting up favorable facts and cir-
cumstances under the large body of authorities that treat the issue.14
101n jury trials, litigants arguing in favor of non-employment status should seek jury instructions that refer
to "independent providers of services" and not "independent contractors," since the word "contractor"
may connote a level of activity and sophistication of enterprise that does not necessarily fit every indepen-
dent worker.
I Many employers share the mistaken belief that an employee becomes an independent provider of ser-
vices simply by signing a "boilerplated" services contract. Such contracts may enumerate various indicia
of independence not in fact observed. For instance, contractually, the worker may have flexibility of work
hours or the ability to substitute services but never actually exercise such "rights" because the recipient
of the services would find such unacceptable in practice.
12The degree of control necessary for a finding of employee status may be lower when applied to profes-
sionals than when applied to non-professionals. See James v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1296 (1956).
13For example, if an employer has three workers, designated as independent but arguably not indepen-
dent, it may want to design its plan coverage to include more persons than the statutory minimums, assum-
ing the three workers potentially designated as independent could not otherwise be statutorily excluded
by reason ot age, service, or union status.
14 As stated in note 9, supra, the practitioner should not consider IRS rulings as being particularly
authoritative. IRS rulings tend to reflect an IRS bias toward finding that an employment status exists. For
planning purposes conforming with the facts and circumstances illustrated in favorable rulings may pro-
vide the practitioner with a rough "safe harbor," departures from which may be considered with care.
1988]
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B. Controlled Group Employees
Aside from taking the position that particular providers of services are not
employees, the sponsor of a qualified plan might wish to assert that the per-
sons in question, although employees, are the employees of another employer
and thus not to be covered under the sponsored plan. Sections 414(b), (c), and
(in) rather precisely limit the efficacy of such assertions when related employers
are involved.
In contrast to the common law employment status test, the controlled group
and affiliated service group employment rules offer relatively concrete stan-
dards for determining which employees will be deemed constructively employed
by a particular employer.t5 The main problem with these rules, and perhaps
the reason why they are sometimes overlooked when plan coverage decisions
are made, is their complexity. For example, practitioners who have dealt with
the constructive ownership rules of Section 267,6 Section 318,17 and Section
54418 must uneasily deal with yet another separate and intricate set of such
rules under the Treasury Regulations for Section 414.19
In addition to distinct constructive ownership rules, Section 414 and its
Regulations form a conglomeration of other concepts borrowed from elsewhere
in the Internal Revenue code. Thus, the controlled group stock ownership stan-
dards are directly borrowed, with modifications, from Section 1563,20 partner-
ship ownership is determined with reference to either profits or capital interests'2
trust and estate ownership percentages may have to be actuarially determined
using concepts developed under Section 2031,22 and certain ownership interests
-are totally excluded in determining control under Sections 414(b) and (c) 3
Attempts to categorize all potential mechanical determinations under Sec-
tions 414(b), (c), and (in) would lead to a checklist that could hardly be described
as a ready reference. Yet, anyone who has submitted an application for a qualified
plan determination letter knows (or should know) that these provisions cannot
be ignored.24 Consequently, the best approach for dealing with the controlled
"To illustrate, § 414(b) borrows the 80 percent of voting control standard defined in § 1563(a)(1) to define
a parent-subsidiary group of controlled corporations.
161. R.C. § 267 governs allowability of losses, expenses, and interest respecting transactions between related
taxpayers.
171.R.C. § 318 deals with constructive ownership of stock for the purpose of determining the federal tax
consequences of corporate distributions and adjustments
18I.R.C. § 544 provides rules for determining stock ownership for the purpose of determining whether
a corporation is a personal holding company under § 542.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4.
20 See supra note 15. The original function of § 1563 is to provide definitions pertinent to the § 1561 limita-
tions on certain multiple tax benefits that would otherwise be available on an unrestricted basis to con-
trolled corporations.
21Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(i)(c).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(ii).
2 1Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-3.
24 1RS Form 5300, "Application for Determination for Defined Benefit Plan" and IRS Form 5301, "Application
[Vol. 5
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and affiliated group rules may be to diagram thoroughly all ownership rela-
tionships traceable via entities, blood, or marriage from a plan sponsor to any
other employer, and then check the particulars of such relationships against
the Section 414 Regulations.
In the event additional employers are to be considered under these rules,
the next inquiry should determine how close the ownership relationships are
to the minimum relationships needed to invoke Sections 414(b), (c), or (m).
If a particular relationship is close to the minimum controlled group standard,
the employer may want to consider a preliminary altering of the ownership rela-
tionship in a manner consistent with other potentially applicable non-plan con-
siderations. For example, if an employer is otherwise to be included for coverage
computation purposes as a result of an 82 % ownership relationship with a cor-
porate parent under Section 414(b) 5 the parent may wish to consider selling
enough stock to remove the subsidiary from the controlled group. If the pro-
posed sale of stock would not have offending tax or non-tax consequences 26
that would outweigh the value of avoiding Section 414(b), it would, of course,
serve as a potential means to effect a de facto coverage exclusion respecting
the parent's qualified plans.
C. Leased Employees
Code Section 414(n) again forces an employer to reconsider its contention
that particular providers of services, although employees, are employees of an-
other employer and thus not to be covered under the sponsored plan. Even though
the sponsoring employer may have no ownership relationship with the leasing
employer, employees of the leasing employer, known technically as "leased em-
ployees" 27 will be treated under Section 414(n) for coverage purposes28 as em-
ployees of the sponsoring employer. However, these rules are inoperative if
the leasing employer provides a required level of qualified plan coverage for
such employees 29 and leased employees do not provide more than 20 % of the
for Determination for Defined Contribution Plan" simply ask (at line 10), "Is the employer a member
of a controlled group of corporations or a group of trades or businesses under common control?" One
wonders how many employer representatives submitting these forms answer "no"' without thoroughly ex-
amining the employer's ownership relationships under § 414(b) and (c). Obviously, misinformation respecting
this question can void a qualified plan's IRS determination letter.
25The minimum standard for controlled group status here is 80% ownership of voting control. See supra
note 15.
26For example, falling below 80% control would prevent the subsidiary from later effecting a nonrecogni-
tion liquidation under § 332.
27The definition of a "leased employee" is contained in § 414(n)(2), which requires an agreement with
a "leasing organization," substantially full-time services for a period of at least one year, and services
of a type historically performed by employees in the business field of the recipient of the services.
28 1.R.C. § 414(n)(3) applies the leased employee concept to several other I.R.C. employee benefits provi-
sions, in addition to § 410, but does not refer to § 401(a)(26). See Part III of this article.
29 1.R.C. § 414(n)(5)(B) mandates use of a money purchase pension plan with a nonintegrated employer
contribution rate for each participant of at least 10 percent of compensation. The plan must also provide
immediate participation and vesting.
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non-highly compensated work force of the employer that hires the leased ser-
vices.30
Like the provisions of Sections 414(b), (c), and (m), Section 414(n) operates
as a trap for negligent or unaware planners. Many employers frequently use
leased employees for business reasons unconnected with the effect of such prac-
tice on qualified plan coverage requirements.3 1 Planners who wish to grab an
easily available handle on the Section 414(n) issue respecting existing ar-
rangements will no doubt refer first to the portion of the leased employee defini-
tion that eliminates persons who have not performed services for the recipient
employer on a substantially full-time basis for a period of at least one year.32
If the planner believes that certain persons have met the leased employee defini-
tion, he or she should, of course, analyze the safe harbor exception for the
potential relief it affords.33 Of course, even if particular providers of services
are found to be leased employees, they do not necessarily have to be included
in any qualified plan of the recipient employer. Such persons must, 'however,
be properly counted and allowably outside plan coverage under Section 410,
as with non-leased employees similarly excluded.
Some planners may want to go beyond existing leased employee ar-
rangements to the deliberate creation of leased employee statuses in order to
effect a de facto coverage exclusion. They will no doubt focus their attention
first on the "20% of nonhighly compensated workforce standard" given in Sec-
tion 414(n)(5)(A), since it presents an objectively determined legal limit.34 Also,
the requirement that the leasing organization provide a substantially funded
money purchase pension plan35 imposes a rather practical cost limitation, since
the recipient employer will ultimately bear the economic burden of all costs
connected with leased employees, presumably in addition to paying a "profit"
to the leasing organization. Has Congress calculated the burdens imposed by
the safe harbor exception carefully enough to remove the incentive to use leased
employees to create a de facto coverage exclusion in all cases? In considering
defined benefit plans, cutbacks in Section 415 allowances 36 coupled with the
20 % of nonhighly compensated workforce limitation, suggest that professional
employers with small plans need no longer inquire into the use of coverage
motivated leased employee arrangements. Employers with larger plans must
30 I.R.C. § 414(n)(5)(A)(ii).
a1 Leased employees often fill temporary positions or satisfy an employer's needs for casual, specialty,
and short-term replacement workers.
321.R.C. § 414(n)(2)(B). Detailed guidance for applying the leased employee rules and definitions may
be obtained from Proposed Regulations § 1.414(n).
"See supra notes 29 and 30 and accompanying text.
341.R.C. § 414(n) did not include this requirement prior to the 1986 Tax Act.
35See supra note 29.
36 1.R.C. § 415(b)(5) now provides reductions in permitted benefit levels based on years of participation
(under ten years) rather than years of service, as was the case prior to the 1986 Tax Act.
[Vol. 5
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regard the issue as involving the weighing of what may be at best marginal
cost savings per employee37 against any possible administrative burdens resulting
from a bifurcated, leased and non-leased status workforce.
If indeed employee leasing has been killed as a coverage exclusion plan-
ning opportunity, we are left, as seems increasingly to be the case under the
Internal Revenue Code, with a "plugged loophole" that serves no further function
than as a potential trap for unwary practitioners. In this case the unwary would
include employers who regularly use leased employees for legitimate business
reasons.3 8
II. STATUTORY COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
A. Age and Service Exclusions
Internal Revenue Code Section 410(a) continues to allow employers to take
advantage of unrestrained exclusions that affect employees who are under age
twenty-one, or have not yet completed one year of service.3 9 Actually, Section
410(a)(1)(B) permits the use of a two years of service exclusion standard 40 if
a participant is granted 100% vesting upon entering the plan. Given the various
administrative complications that frequently accompany the use of vesting
schedules,4 as well as cutbacks in permitted vesting limitations from the 1986
Tax Act, more employers should consider use of the two-year service exclusion.
The problem, in general, with age and service exclusions is that they pro-
vide a somewhat transitory and ungovernable basis for limiting coverage costs.
At any given time prior to implementation of a qualified retirement plan a clear
view of the impact (savings) of age and service exclusions exists, but once a
plan has been in operation for a few years, only termination of service will
keep most employees from fulfilling the age and service standards. In many
situations this results only in deferred, not permanently avoided, plan coverage
costs. Any proposed attempts to manipulate employment statuses so as to max-
imize the usefulness of age and coverage exclusions must be carefully considered
in light of the impact of such attempts on the plan's continued qualification
37Theoretically, marginal savings per employee could be substantial in the aggregate depending on the
substantiality of the employer's normal plan contributions in comparison with the total overhead and prof-
it "load" of the leasing arrangement.
3 8For those who are "wary" but have difficulty applying the § 414(n) rules and definitions, the effect
of the provision may be to restrict informally full use of discretionary coverage exclusions so as to allow
an appropriate margin of error. See note 13, supra.
39Since a year of service is defined in § 410(a)(3)(A) as a 12-month period during which an employee
has not less than 1,000 hours of service, accurate counting of service hours is critical for employers who
rely on the one year of service rule to exclude part-time employees from plan participation.
40 The two year standard (formerly three years) is effective for plan years beginning after December 31,
1988 under the 1986 Tax Act.
41 For example, it is often quite difficult to determine when a partial plan termination has occurred. However,
if cessation of service by a group of employees does result in a partial termination, a plan will lose its
qualification status unless all accrued benefits are made non-forfeitable for partially terminated employees,
regardless of their position on the plan's vesting schedule. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3).
19881
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and the employer's or plan officials' compliance with their obligations 42 under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).P
Similarly, the qualified plan itself, the Regulations under Section 410 re-
mind us, must not be drafted with individually designed exclusions having an
indirect effect of age or service exclusions more restrictive than Section 410(a)
permits. Thus, a plan cannot require an employee, as a condition for participa-
tion, to serve a specified number of years in a status that could result in the
employee's attaining an age beyond 21 years or service beyond the one or two
year requirement.44
B. Union Status Exclusion
Code Section 410(b)(3) lists three additional statutory exclusions, including
the often-used exclusion for employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment resulting from good faith bargaining that includes the subject of retire-
ment benefits.45 To prevent manipulation of the union exclusion by means of
the creation of sham arrangements for collective bargaining, the 1986 Tax Act
amended Section 7701(a)(46) to specify that a collective bargaining agreement
must be a "bona fide" agreement between "bona fide" employee representatives
and one or more employers. Thus, deliberate creation of a "friendly" or con-
trolled union to avoid coverage obligations under a qualified retirement plan
is not a planning alternative.
Legitimate reliance on the union exclusion can, however, still create a com-
pliance problem. Since the exclusion is expressly predicated upon the existence
of a collective bargaining agreement, the exclusion is jeopardized in situations
involving extended negotiations of new or renewed agreements following the
expiration of a former collective bargaining agreement. If a group of excluded
workers is left on the job for some period "without a contract," the require-
ment of Section 401(a)(6) that the coverage rules of Section 410 be met on at
least one day in each quarter may be violated if meeting Section 410 depends
upon fulfillment of the union exclusion.
III. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECrION 401(a)(26)
Code Section 401(a)(26), beginning with plan years after December 31,
42 The exclusive benefit rule of § 401(a)(2) or the nondiscrimination rule of § 401(n)(4) would likely be
violated if an employer deliberately fired certain employees prior to their attaining age 21 in order to avoid
having to cover them in a qualified plan.
43 Would the actions of the employer in the immediately preceding note be tantamount to a deliberate denial
of ERISA rights so as to subject the responsible individuals to the criminal penalties of ERISA § 501?
ERISA § 510 also makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee's ERISA rights by
discharging the employee.
44Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)-3(e)(2) gives an example of such an impermissible exclusion involving a plan
requiring as a condition of participation that each employee have had a driver's license for at least 15
years. Such a provision will be treated as a prohibited age requirement.
45I.R.C. § 410(b)(3)(A).
[Vol. 5
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1988, operates as an ultimate limitation upon individually designed plan exclu-
sions. After taking into account the statutory exclusions of Section 410(a) and
(b), Section 401(a)(26) requires that a qualified plan benefit the lesser of 50
employees or 40% or more of all employees of the sponsoring employer.
This minimum coverage requirement must be met "on each day of the plan
year,"' 46 in contrast with the requirement of Section 401(a)(6) that the Section
410 coverage standards be met on at least one day in each quarter. Consequent-
ly, planners who design allowable non-statutory coverage exclusions so as to
barely meet the Section 401(a)(26) requirement will be working with a narrow
"margin of error" that permits virtually no corrective response time in situa-
tions involving a shift in personnel that results in a sudden widening of the
excluded group of employees in relation to the covered group 7
A specific employer's susceptibility to such calamitous shifts in personnel
can be gauged only by carefully examining the employer's past personnel pat-
terns while considering the potential effect of any forecasted or planned business
growth or contraction circumstances that may alter past and present patterns.
If an employer wishes to maximize plan coverage exclusions as permitted by
Section 401(a)(26), it must be prepared to alter coverage levels as necessary
to prevent plan disqualification when personnel changes occur. 8 To the extent
the employer views the monitoring and alteration of coverage levels to be too
administratively burdensome, it will choose to define coverage exclusions with
a requisite "buffer zone" that allows for normal (predictable) personnel changes.
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 410(b)
A. Mechanical Tests
Like Section 401(a)(26), Section 410(b) imposes "minimum coverage re-
quirements" as a condition for plan qualification. Thus, a qualified plan must
concurrently comply with two sets of limitations that affect the scope of per-
mitted coverage exclusions. Whereas Section 401(a)(26) imposes only one
mechanically formulated limitation, Section 410(b) permits alternative com-
pliance with any one of four coverage limitations. Two of these limitations,
contained in Section 410(b)(1)(A) and (B) 49 are, like Section 401(a)(26),
46I.R.C. § 401(a)(26)(A).
47 1For instance, the covered employees might belong to a division that is contracting while the excluded
employees are in a division that is expanding. Relief from the § 410(b) requirements may be granted for
a "transition period" (that may exceed one year) in situations involving workers who become or cease
to be members of a controlled group of employers as defined in § 414. See § 410(b)(6)(C).
48 Drafted coverage definitions might include a clause that permits some defined expansion of coverage
to address such personnel shifts without the need to amend the plan. For example, the coverage definition
might include a particular grouping of employees plus such additional workers from other groupings as
are needed to fulfill designated statutory coverage criteria from time to time. The additional workers need-
ed would be selected in some objective, nondiscriminatory manner.
49All § 410(b) coverage tests rely on a coverage concept that requires inclusion of rank and file employees
in direct relation to the extent the plan benefits "highly compensated employees" as defined in § 414(q).
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mechanically expressed, and therefore operate as rather easily determinable
safe harbor coverage rules.
The main difference between these two mechanical limitations for purposes
of designing coverage exclusions relates to the effect of including varying numbers
of highly compensated employees in a plan. Under Section 410(b)(1)(A), a plan
must cover, after statutory exclusions, at least 70% of employees who are not
highly compensated employees, regardless of the number of highly compen-
sated employees covered. Under Section 410(b)(1)(B), the number of employees
mandatorily covered who are not highly compensated employees will vary direct-
ly with the number of highly compensated employees included in the plan.
By using Section 410(b)(1)(B), an employer can "leverage" the exclusion
of certain highly compensated employees so as to exclude potentially great
numbers of employees who are not highly compensated employees. For example,
if, after statutory exclusions, there remain four highly compensated employees
and one hundred employees who are not highly compensated, designing a plan's
coverage exclusions to eliminate even one highly compensated employee will
reduce mandatory coverage of employees who are not highly compensated from
seventy to fifty-three employees.50 By contrast, reliance on the Section
410(b)(1)(A) limitation would require coverage of seventy employees who are
not highly compensated employees in any event.
B. Classification Based Tests
Employers who desire coverage exclusion flexibility beyond that available
with the Section 410(b)(1)(A) and (B) tests will want to consider the "average
benefit percentage" test of Section 410(b)(2) and the "line of business excep-
tion" of Section 410(b)(5). The former test permits employers with two or more
qualified plans to consider, in effect, the comparability5" of disparate plans while
ignoring, to a degree, the extent of coverage existing under any one plan in
favor of an overall view of benefits provided for rank and file employees under
all plans in comparison with the extent highly compensated employees are
benefited under all plans.52 The line of business rule also permits a potential
widening of coverage exclusions, based solely upon legitimate organizational
and operational distinctions adopted by an employer.53
5 Eliminating two highly compensated employees would reduce coverage of employees who are not highly
compensated to thirty-five employees. Eliminating three highly compensated (perhaps leaving only the
"boss" covered among the four executives) would reduce coverage of rank and file workers to twenty-five
employees.
5 See Rev. Rul. 81-202, 1981-2 C.B. 93.
12 Under I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A)(ii), the "average benefit percentage" for rank and file employees must be
at least 70% of that for highly compensated employees.
51I.R.C. § 414(r) sets forth definitions and rules for the determination of separate lines of business, which
are effectively treated as separate employers for purposes of the § 410(b) coverage tests. To establish a
separate line of business, a minimum of fifty employees is required. I.R.C. § 414(r)(1) states: "For pur-
poses of sections 89 and 410(b), an employer shall be treated as operating separate lines of business during
[Vol. 5
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Both Section 410(b)(2) and Section 410(b)(5) require that a plan benefit
such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the employer and
found by the Treasury not to be discriminatory in favor of highly compensated
employees.54 All but very recent practitioners will recognize the "classifica-
tion" concept derived under Section 410(b)(1)(B) as it existed under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954.55 As under former law, many practitioners working
with the newest version of Section 410(b) will tend to avoid using the "classifica-
tion" standard for designing coverage exclusions, since the blend of rules that
purportedly define a nondiscriminatory classification of employees remain
somewhat confusing and vulnerable to subjective interpretation.5 6
To be sure, many other practitioners, adept at convincing their IRS
determination letter examiners that their plans cover nondiscriminatory classi-
fications of employees, will continue to reduce employer coverage costs by
struggling with what amounts to a very complicated facts and circumstances
test.57 The greatest problem with the "classification" standard is not the pro-
curing of an initial determination letter. The greatest problem is the continuous,
periodic monitoring of coverage that must immediately proceed from a plan's
adoption under a less than definite and (generally poorly understood) set of
rules. Those who feel uneasy and ill-equipped to monitor the coverage effect
of shifting personnel patterns under the mechanical tests of Section 410(b)(1)(A)
and (B) will not be overjoyed to undertake such responsibility respecting coverage
exclusions adopted in reliance on the average benefit percentage test or the line-
any year if the employer for bona fide business reasons operates separate lines of business." Since the
separate lines of business must be "operated" by the employer, apparently § 410(b)(5) has no effect on
the controlled group employer rules of § 414(b) and (c). It seems anomalous that one employer might
be able to treat two divisions as separate employers for plan coverage purposes while not being able to
so regard an entirely separate (and not totally owned in common) business entity.
54 1.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A)(i); I.R.C. § 410(b)(5)(B).
5 51.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) prior to the 1986 Tax Act changes requires a plan to benefit "such employees as
qualify under a classification set up by the employer and found by the Secretary not to be discriminatory
in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensated."
'
6The Conference Agreement for the 1986 Tax Act states that the classification test "... is to be applied
on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, including the difference between the coverage
percentages of the highly compensated employees and the other employees, the percentage of total employees
covered, and the difference between the compensation of the covered employees and the compensation
of the excluded employees." H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-413(1986). No further guidance
is given by Congress to assist in the settings of standards respecting the differences deemed critical.
57Like all facts and circumstances tests under tax law, there really is no limit to the number and nature
of considerations that will influence a final result under the "classification" criteria. Theoretically, only
the practitioner's imagination limits his or her arguments in favor of a nondiscriminatory coverage finding
in a particular situation. For example, if a classification is in doubt upon examination, it could be asserted
that while the number of highly compensated employees covered is arguably a bit too high, one should
also compare the highly compensated employees covered with those not covered. If such a comparison
yielded disparities in ownership interests, compensation levels, and managerial control that make the covered
highly compensated employees as a group appear "less highly compensated" than the noncovered elite,
presumably such disparities would be an additional factor for the examiner to consider. No doubt the in-
creasing use of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements for top executives will, for some employers,
result in such potential coverage disparities among highly compensated employees.
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of-business exception."
V. COVERAGE EXCLUSION SELECTION FACTORS
A. Technical Considerations
One approach to designing coverage exclusions would consider the poten-
tial administrative problems of particular exclusions in view of the various legal
limitations previously discussed. If a coverage exclusion will be too difficult
to monitor and thus too dangerous a threat to a plan's qualified status, any
perceived cost savings or other advantage will be outweighed by a potential
tax disaster.
In balancing risk against benefit in this manner, the planner will want to
be wary of Section 402(b), which provides that a plan losing its qualification
due to a violation of Section 410(b) will have its trust continue to be treated
as tax exempt only with respect to participants who are not highly compen-
sated employees. 59 Participants who are highly compensated employees, by con-
trast, will face income recognition respecting their entire vested accrued benefit
(less employee contributions), not just vested employer contributions allocated
to them in a disqualification year.0 This tax consequence makes Section 410(b)
violations, in many situations, far more serious than other qualification viola-
tions under Section 401(a), including violations of the minimum coverage stan-
dard of Section 401(a)(26).6 ' In particular, this disparity in tax treatment upon
disqualification may make plan administrators quite nervous about coverage
exclusions based upon the "classification" tests of Section 410(b). No doubt
some plan administrators will conclude that dealing with "risky" coverage ex-
clusions is unduly burdensome.6 2
Of course, a plan administrator must similarly be concerned about the effect
of specific coverage exclusions upon legal rights and duties existing independently
of the plan's qualification status. For example, a selected coverage exclusion
should not interfere with other contractual undertakings of the employer, such
"
8 Attorneys and other practitioners who urge adoption of a "classification" coverage approach should either
undertake the necessary monitoring themselves or educate others, such as "in-house" personnel, to do
so. At the outset such advisers should discuss with their clients both the importance of such monitoring
and the administrative burdens and costs of such. The latter topic may properly be raised in the context
of an explanation of how and to what extent adoption of a "classification" participation standard would
save coverage costs.
59 1.R.C. § 402(b)(2)(A).
60 Under § 402(b)(1) all participants would face income recognition respecting vested employer contribu-
tions allocated in a disqualification year.
61As noted in Section III., I.R.C. § 401(a)(26) must be complied with on each day of the plan year and
thus could potentially create a greater disqualification threat than § 410(b), which need be satisfied on
only one day in each quarter.
62Employee benefits personnel may have enough to be concerned with by way of less discretionary tax
risks, such as those now imposed respecting health plan continuation coverage under § 162(k). Similar
to the approach taken under I.R.C. Section 402(b), § 106(b) tags highly compensated employees for in-
come recognition when an employer fails to meet the continuing coverage requirements of § 162(k).
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as employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements. And, a coverage
exclusion must not violate applicable non-tax laws, such as labor relations
statutes, nondiscrimination laws, or constitutional prohibitions.6 3 All plan ad-
ministrators should agree that they have a large enough burden avoiding penalties
and litigation under pension and tax law, without having to worry about claims
based on other laws.
B. Coverage Costs
Any employer will be willing to undertake a considerable administrative
burden if the resulting cost savings are significant enough. Thus, before a planner
dismisses "risky" coverage exclusions, such as those based upon "classifica-
tion" standards, an attempt should be made to calculate the ostensible coverage
cost increases that result from selection of exclusions deemed safer or less ad-
ministratively burdensome.6 4
Protracted actual costs of implementing a qualified retirement plan may
be quite difficult to ascertain, not solely because of uncertainty respecting the
employer's future personnel structure, but also because of potential cost off-
sets that may be available. For example, consider the situation of an employer
that is having difficulty staffing its night shifts as a result of setting too low
a pay differential for night work. One solution to this problem would be to
increase the direct pay rate for night workers to the minimum level necessary
to attract and keep sufficient numbers of late shift workers. Another solution
- one that might attract workers most concerned about their retirement in-
come security - would be to implement a qualified deferred compensation
plan65 that covers only night shift employees plus certain selected highly com-
pensated employees. This latter solution would generate coverage costs but such
would otherwise have been offset by a direct pay increase that would have been
necessary in any event. If excluding day shift workers in favor of night shift
workers results in coverage compliance deemed too dangerously close66 to the
Section 410 or 401(a)(26) minimums, the costs attendant to any proposed ex-
pansion of coverage could accordingly be quantified and viewed as true addi-
tional costs not necessarily subject to offset.
Actually, in considering cost offsets, the employer should take stock of its
6 3 Obviously, a plan must not contain coverage exclusions based on factors like an employee's sex, race,
religion, union activities, or exercise of rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
64The new, more limited vesting schedule choices under § 411 resulting from the 1986 Tax Act must be
considered in calculating coverage costs projected into the future.
65Adopting a qualified profit sharing plan would afford the employer sufficient contributions flexibility
to determine by experiment the "minimum" economic incentive needed to retain the desired personnel
placements. Whereas employees may be willing to accept fluctuating profit sharing plan contributions,
direct pay raises, once given, are difficult to adjust downward without affecting employee morale. This
fact of life is no doubt attributable to an employee's tendency to rely fully upon current pay to maintain
his or her adopted standard of living and financial commitments.
66The planner would want to consider historical fluctuations in night shift staffing before deciding what
coverage level comfortably complies with the statutory minimums.
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entire compensation package, which is likely to involve other components in
addition to "paycheck" compensation.67 If a qualified deferred compensation
plan clearly expands the compensation package without affecting its other com-
ponents, then the costs of such expansion can be reasonably quantified based
upon the best available projections respecting the employer's personnel needs.
But, in viewing a proposed retirement plan in the context of total compensa-
tion, the employer will want to consider the possibility that the deferred com-
pensation plan may be able to serve as a substitute for all or part of another
component, or other components, in the compensation package. Indeed, the
deferred compensation plan may not actually result in a reduction of other pay
or benefit levels' but may substitute, as illustrated above, for planned or pro-
posed expansions of such pay or benefit levels.68
The concept of minimizing the true costs of a retirement plan by searching
the whole compensation package for offsets may be particularly attractive for
employers that have implemented nondeferred profit sharing programs or similar
bonus-type award structures that frequently take the place of across the board
annual raises.69 Many employers find that using annual bonuses or profit share
awards gives the employer some means to control personnel costs while creating
potential performance incentives that may lead to overall productivity. In many
cases it would not be a difficult step to substitute the tax favored benefits of
a qualified deferred compensation plan for some portion of year-end employee
bonuses otherwise determined in the employer's discretion or pursuant to a
formula that could be credibly modified by the employer.
If the employer carefully considers all potential plan cost offsets, it may
find that a qualified retirement plan will involve less expense than otherwise
imagined. This being the case, the employer may correspondingly feel less com-
pelled to squeeze every dollar possible out of the coverage limitations set by
the Internal Revenue Code, especially if to do so creates potential compliance
problems for the plan. 0
C. Incentives and Disincentives
In many instances selection of coverage exclusions sends a message to both
the excluded and included employees. If the message is one of reward for the
included employees and hope for the excluded employees, employee morale
67 Employers tend increasingly to communicate to employees that their "pay" is really a "compensation
package" that often contains several items, including even the employer's contribution to the Social Security
system.
61 But the employer might want to consider strong employee preferences for particular compensation package
configurations, as frequently expressed in collective bargaining negotiations.
69 Often an employer will "freeze" basic wage and salary rates while granting the equivalent of raises
in the form of year-end awards that may fluctuate downward. The observation made at note 65, supra,
applies as well here.
70 Cost conscious employers will still want to consider available cost savings features of qualified plans
like Social Security integration and vesting schedules.
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may be enhanced, or at least not adversely affected. If the message is one of
favoritism and exploitation, the unofficial political structure of the workplace
may change for the worse. Such potential effects may play a subjective but im-
portant role in the selection of coverage exclusions. Once an employer or its
advisors have a good idea whether and to what extent cost savings and ad-
ministrative burdens should influence coverage exclusion choices, actual selection
of covered and non-covered employees can commence pursuant to a variety
of considerations.
At the outset existing organizational distinctions between groups of
employees should be identified: hourly/salaried, technical or skilled/nonskilled,
day shift/evening shift, management/clerical, etc. Other distinguishing features
should also be noted, such as workplace locations, divisional designations, prod-
uct line differences, job classification variations, and the like. Since the coverage
rules under the Code outside the statutory exclusions do not suggest any par-
ticular basis for determining coverage exclusions71 as long as minimum coverage
numbers are observed, the employer is free to match any existing grouping
of employees against such minimum coverage numbers to create yet another
identifying feature that serves to further define such groupings. Selecting for
coverage particular groupings of employees who have demonstrated above
average performances on the job, especially performances that have been long
term and capable of objective measurement, will no doubt augment an employer's
overall system for rewarding productivity.
Special attention may have to be given to highly compensated employees
in this regard. Since the various Section 410(b) tests proportionately link coverage
of non-highly compensated employees with coverage of highly compensated
employees, generally speaking, coverage exclusions may expand to the extent
highly compensated employees are excluded from a qualified plan. As noted,
the exclusion of even one highly compensated employee from the plan of a small
employer will often have a substantial impact on the number of rank and file
employees that must be covered under the Section 410(b)(1)(B) test 72
Unfortunately, excluding key executives from a qualified plan may affect
an employer's ability to retain and maintain the morale of such employees. For-
tunately, however, an employer can usually find a way to provide alternative
incentives for key executives, often at a total cost that is lower when compared
to the effect of including such personnel in a qualified retirement plan. Obvi-
ously, stock incentive plans and nonqualified deferred compensation arrange-
ments73 can play a significant role in satisfying excluded highly compensated
7t Of course, the distinction between highly compensated employees and nonhighly compensated employees
must be observed.
72See note 50, supra, and accompanying text.
73 Nonqualified "Rabbi Trust" plans have become popular. These plans permit a degree of funding that
may make an executive feel more secure about a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement and
thus less desirous of participating in a qualified plan.
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employees.
One alternative to using coverage selection as a reward for high perfor-
mance is to design a system for profit sharing plan contribution allocations that
reflects objectively determined performance criteria. Under such a system, few
coverage exclusions would be needed to distinguish mediocre performance
groups from those exhibiting above average performance, since performance
levels could be directly reflected in the participants' relative sharing in plan
contributions.7 4 A nondiscriminatory contribution allocation formula based on
"performance points," or the like, would have the advantage of permitting an-
nual determinations of merit for individuals, rather than groups of individuals.
By contrast, using coverage inclusions and exclusions as incentives or disincen-
tives tends to be an "all or nothing" tool, since once plan participation is granted,
such typically inures until an employee terminates service. 5
Nonetheless, it would be possible, and for some employers perhaps
desirable, to use plan coverage itself as an initial incentive to promote group
performance. Once coverage status was attained, employees might still be sub-
ject to further incentives via an appropriate contribution allocation formula.
Thus, coverage exclusions could operate in conjunction with the plan's con-
tribution allocation formula as a kind of "double incentive" system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite changes in the 1986 Tax Act intended to broaden employee par-
ticipation in qualified retirement plans, the coverage requirements for qualifica-
tion are still a long way from mandating total employee participation. Employers
not wanting individually designed coverage exclusions must still be acutely aware
of various technical distinctions, including those affecting a worker's basic status
as an employee, that might become qualification pitfalls after a plan's implemen-
tation. For employers wishing to take advantage of permitted discretionary
coverage exclusions, a great deal of creative planning is still available to effect
potential cost savings while implementing personnel goals and policies.
74 Care must be taken to prevent such an allocation formula from operating in a discriminatory manner
in violation of § 401(a)(4). See Auner v. United States, 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971).
75As long as a proper number of nonhighly compensated employees are covered under the statutory tests,
there appears to be no reason why a plan could not adopt coverage definitions based on performance criteria
alone, as established from time to time. Some employees would "float" in and out of coverage status,
depending upon their fulfillment of the designated performance criteria for a given period. The practical
effect would be to grant or deny contribution allocations in whole for particular employees in particular
plan years, something like an "all or nothing," merit-based contribution allocation formula would operate
in a plan containing static coverage definitions.
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